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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SCOPE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE-"INEVITABLE DISCOVERY" EXCEPTION ADOPTED. Fain v.
State, 271 Ark. 874, 611 S.W.2d 508 (1981).
On March 14, 1980, two men robbed the Union Bank in Ben-
ton, Arkansas. Immediate pursuit of the suspects led two state po-
lice officers and a sheriff to a house where they found David Fain
and Michael Brewer hidden in the attic. After forcing the men from
the attic, one officer took Fain outside the house to a patrol car. The
other officer remained in the attic with the sheriff and searched for a
gun used in the robbery and for money taken from the bank. When
their search proved unsuccessful, the sheriff walked downstairs and
asked Fain where he had hidden the gun and money. Fain revealed
the location of the items. The sheriff returned to the attic, where the
gun and the money were immediately discovered hidden under in-
sulation as Fain had described. None of the officers had advised
Fain of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona I when the sher-
iff asked Fain for the items' location.
The Saline County Circuit Court denied Fain's motion to sup-
press the introduction into evidence of the gun and the money as
products of the unlawful interrogation. The evidence was admitted
at trial, and Fain was convicted of aggravated robbery and theft of
property and sentenced to twenty-one years in prison. In affirming
Fain's conviction, the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the "Inevi-
table Discovery Rule." The court held that the gun and money were
indeed found as a result of illegal questioning, but that they were
nevertheless properly admitted at trial under this rule because they
would have been discovered regardless of whether Fain had re-
vealed their location. Fain v. State, 271 Ark. 874, 611 S.W.2d 508
(1981).
Generally, any evidence obtained through violation of an indi-
vidual's constitutional rights is not admissible against him in a crim-
inal prosecution.2 As developed by the United States Supreme
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). According to this decision, an individual in police custody
must be warned of the following before being subjected to interrogation: That he has the
right to remain silent; that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law; that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney; and that an attorney will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he cannot afford one.
2. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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Court,3 this "exclusionary rule" is applied by both federal 4 and
state5 courts in criminal prosecutions, and is designed to ensure en-
forcement of an individual's constitutional guarantees. 6 The ration-
ale is that law enforcement officials will be deterred from using
unlawful means to discharge their duties if the government cannot
use at trial any advantage it gained in this way.7
To fully accomplish this deterrent purpose, the exclusionary
rule must apply not only to evidence seized as a direct result of an
illegal act, but also to any other evidence ultimately discovered be-
cause of that act. The Supreme Court has therefore extended the
scope of the rule through development of the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine.8 According to this doctrine, all derivative evidence is
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (exclusionary rule was applied to bar all
warningless confessions); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (rule applied to sixth
amendment violations); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (rule extended to fourth amend-
ment violations in state court proceedings); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
(rule applied to bar fourth amendment violations in federal court proceedings); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (rule first applied by the Court to bar compelled
testimony).
4. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6. The Court stated in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954), "All these
methods [of illegal search] are outlawed, and convictions obtained by means of them are
invalidated, because they encourage the kind of society that is obnoxious to free men."
7. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914); Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary
Rule, 55 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 307 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Unpoisoning the Fruit].
8. The basis for the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is in Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The case involved government subpoenas issued as
the result of information obtained in an unlawful search and seizure. Holding that a court
could not force the company to obey the subpoenas, Justice Holmes stated for the Court,
"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be
used at all." Id. at 392.
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine was first described as such in Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), in which the Court held that the prosecution must allow
the accused to inquire into the uses to which it had put information gained through illegal
wiretapping. The Court stated that to exclude the exact words heard through the unlawful
interception but "to put no curb on their full indirect use" would stultify the policy enunci-
ated in Silverthorne and would only invite the very methods there deemed inconsistent with
ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty. Id. at 340.
The Court has not yet decided whether the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies
to evidence obtained as a result of information gained in an interrogation conducted without
Miranda warnings. The Court found it unnecessary to consider this broad question in
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), in which the Court refused to apply the doctrine to
exclude the testimony of a witness whose identity was revealed by the accused during a pre-
Miranda interrogation conducted without the full Miranda warnings, Justice Brennan,
joined by Justice Marshall, concurred, stating that if Miranda applied to the fruits of warn-
ingless statements, its effect should be limited to those cases which involved a post-Miranda
"fruit" of the "poisonous tree" (the initial police illegality) and is as
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution as is the direct evidence
gained from the illegality.9
Ironically, the same cases which expanded the scope of the ex-
clusionary rule through development of the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine simultaneously limited the scope of the rule through
the creation of three exceptions to its operation: the independent
source, attenuated connection, and purged taint exceptions. In
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,'I the Supreme Court em-
phasized that, despite the operation of the exclusionary rule, evi-
dence acquired as the result of an illegal act does not "become
sacred and inaccessible."" Rather, if knowledge of facts "is gained
from an independent source they may be proved like any others
... .,,2 The Court again recognized this implied independent
source exception to the exclusionary rule in Nardone v. United
States,'3 yet at the same time created a new exception through the
following statement: "In practice this generalized statement [from
Silverthorne, quoted above] may conceal concrete complexities. So-
phisticated argument may prove a causal connection between infor-
mation obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the Government's
proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such connection may
have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' 14
In Wong Sun v. United States, '5 the government conceded that
it would not have found the evidence in question but for the defend-
ant's illegally obtained statement. The Supreme Court, in holding
that the evidence was inadmissible, considered both the independ-
ent source and attenuated connection exceptions to the exclusionary
rule and found neither was applicable. However, the Court then
formulated another exception to the rule, the purged taint exception,
which arguably is broader than the other two. The Court stated
interrogation. Id. at 458. However, Justice Douglas in a dissent stated that the testimony
"must be excluded to comply with Miranda's mandate that 'no evidence obtained as a result
of interrogation [not preceded by adequate warnings] can be used against' an accused." Id.
at 464 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (emphasis added)).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962). This doctrine was
not expressed in the form of a rule by the Supreme Court in the cases in which it was
developed; thus, there is no classic statement of the doctrine.
10. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
11. Id. at 392.
12. Id. (emphasis added).
13. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
14. Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
15. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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that, even if the tainted evidence is indisputably the "but for" cause
of locating the derivative evidence, the derivative evidence may be
admitted if it has not been obtained by exploitation of that initial
illegality but instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to bepurged
of the primary taint. 16
Thus, the Supreme Court has developed three separate, yet in-
terrelated, exceptions to the operation of the exclusionary rule. Al-
though they are formulated with differing terminology, all three
exceptions allow the prosecution to remove the taint from fruits of
illegal police acts by establishing that the improper conduct was not
a sine qua non or "but for" cause of the discovery of the evidence.' 7
As an extension of this rationale, lower courts have developed the
"inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule, which al-
lows the prosecution to remove the taint from derivative evidence by
proving that the evidence would have been discovered through law-
ful means even without the official misconduct.' 8
The United States Supreme Court has neither ruled on the con-
stitutionality of this inevitable discovery doctrine nor expressly
adopted it as an exception to the exclusionary rule. In fact, the
Court has denied certiorari in many cases clearly raising the issue.19
However, the Court has twice acknowledged the existence of the in-
evitable discovery rationale, once in a footnote 20 and once in a dis-
senting opinion. 21 Additionally, at least two Justices have expressed
16. Id. at 488 (quoting J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)) (author's
emphasis).
17. See Unpoisoning the Fruit, supra note 7, at 313. Accord, United States v. Coplon,
185 F.2d 629, 640 (2d Cir. 1950), in which Judge Learned Hand stated that evidence is
excluded by the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine only when it "would not have been
found, if officials had not violated the laws designed to deny them access to it."
18. LaCount & Girese, The "Inevitable Discovery" Rule, An Evolving Exception to the
Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 40 ALBANY L. REv. 483, 485-86 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
LaCount & Girese].
19. E.g., United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913
(1970); United States v. Schipani, 414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922
(1970); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1050 (1973).
20. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), police elicited incriminating statements
and the location of the victim's body from an accused murderer after he had terminated
interrogation until able to consult with his lawyer. The Court sustained exclusion of the
incriminating statements, but stated in a footnote that "evidence of where the body was
found and of its condition might well be admissible on the theory that the body would have
been discovered in any event, even had incriminating statements not been elicited from Wil-
liams." Id. at 407 n.12 (emphasis added).
21. In United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), the Court held that the attenu-
ated connection between the illegal search and the testimony of a witness discovered
through that search rendered the testimony admissible. Id. at 279. Thus, the Court based its
an interest in the doctrine, stating that "it is a significant constitu-
tional question whether the 'independent source' exception to inad-
missibility of fruits encompasses a hypothetical as well as an actual
independent source."22 The development of the exception has, how-
ever, been left to federal circuit and state courts, where it has re-
ceived fairly wide-spread acceptance.
The first clear application of the theory of inevitable discovery
was in 1943 by the Second Circuit in Somer v. United States.
23
There, police officers arrested the defendant after his wife revealed,
during an unlawful search of his apartment, that he would soon re-
turn home. At the time of the arrest, the officers seized incriminat-
ing evidence from the defendant's car. Although the Second Circuit
reversed the district court's refusal to suppress this evidence, the
court remanded the case with leave to the prosecution to retry the
case to
show that, quite independently of what Somer's wife told them,
the officers would have gone to the street, have waited for Somer
and have arrested him, exactly as they did. If they can satisfy the
court of this, so that it appears that they did not need the infor-
mation, the seizure may have been lawful.
24
Although the Second Circuit impliedly rejected the inevitable dis-
covery exception in 1962 in United States v. Paroutian,25 stating that
holding on the attenuated connection exception to the exclusionary rule and did not decide
the validity of the inevitable discovery holding of the lower court. However, the dissenting
opinion noted,
The Court would apparently first determine whether the evidence stemmed from
an independent source or would inevitably have been discovered; if neither of these
rules was found to apply, as here, the Court would still somehow take into account
[as attenuation] the fact that . . . witnesses sometimes do come forward of their
own volition.
Id. at 287-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
22. Fitzpatrick v. New York, 414 U.S. 1050, 1051 (1973) (White and Douglas, JJ., dis-
senting from the Court's denial of certiorari).
23. 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943). Throughout this discussion of the development of the
inevitable discovery exception, only those cases with facts most similar to those in Fain v.
State, 271 Ark. 874, 611 S.W.2d 508 (1981), will be examined in the text.
24. 1d. at 792.
25. 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962). The court, in holding that heroin and a letter found as
the result of information obtained in a prior illegal search of the defendant's apartment
should have been suppressed, stated that
a showing that the government had sufficient independent information available so
that in the normal course of events it might have discovered the questioned evi-
dence without an illegal search cannot excuse the illegality or cure tainted matter.
Such a rule would relax the protection of the right of privacy in the very cases in
which, by the government's own admission, there is no reason for an unlawful
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"[the test must be one of actualities, not possibilities, ' 26 the court
subsequently returned to its Somer reasoning and has apparently
adopted this exception to the exclusionary rule.27
The District of Columbia Circuit has likewise apparently ac-
cepted the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.
In two cases in 1963 and 1964, the court applied the rationale of the
exception to uphold the admission of coroners' testimony concern-
ing the cause of death of illegally discovered corpses. Because the
bodies would inevitably have been found even without the unlawful
police conduct, the court reasoned that any taint on the evidence
secured from the bodies had been purged. 8
In United States v. Melvin,29 the First Circuit upheld the district
court's refusal to suppress firearms found in the defendant's home
during a search pursuant to his arrest, even though the defendant
claimed the evidence was found as a result of statements elicited
from him before he was given Miranda warnings. Although the
court specifically held that this evidence fell into the independent
source exception to the exclusionary rule,30 it used language indicat-
ing that the true basis for the decision was the inevitable discovery
exception. Noting that police had already started their search of the
cellar where the firearms were discovered before the defendant
made his statements, the court stated that the officers "certainly
search. The better the government's case against an individual, the freer it would
be to invade his privacy. We cannot accept such a result.
Id. at 489.
26. Id. at 489.
27. See United States v. Leonardi, 623 F.2d 746, 751 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928
(1980), in which the court stated that the connection between evidence which was "subject to
inevitable discovery through lawful means" and its illegal source was sufficiently attenuated
that admission of the evidence at trial would not tend to encourage future violations.
Accord, United States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1973), in which the court upheld
the district court's refusal to suppress the testimony of a witness whose identity was discov-
ered by means of an address book illegally seized from the defendant's apartment. The
court stated that "[e]ven if the address book had shortened or facilitated the investigation, it
did not supply fruit sufficiently poisonous to be fatal" because "[iut would have been only a
question of time before the government by a so-called saturation investigation, or otherwise,
would have discovered the broker and the importation documents." ld. at 40.
28. Killough v. United States, 336 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (the body was found as the
result of the defendant's illegally secured confession, but its location near a road, in an open
space only partially covered by debris, and close to a heavily populated area near where the
defendant was arrested indicated that it soon would have been discovered).
Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963) (the
body was discovered during an unlawful search of the defendant's apartment, but the vic-
tim's sister had informed police prior to their search that her sister was there).
29. 596 F.2d 492 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 837 (1979).
30. Id. at 500.
19811 NOTES 557
would have uncovered the firearms regardless of appellant's
statements."3
Both the Third Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have decided
cases clearly applying the rationale of the inevitable discovery ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule. 2 Although the Fifth Circuit had
previously rejected the exception as a valid limitation upon the op-
eration of the exclusionary rule,33 the court expressly adopted it in a
recent case.34 The Ninth Circuit has also expressly adopted the in-
evitable discovery exception.35
The Seventh Circuit expressly adopted the inevitable discovery
exception in United States ex. ret Owens v. Twomey.3 6 The court in
that case stated that Wong Sun added a third dimension to the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine such that there were three tests to be
applied in the determination of whether evidence is indeed tainted
31. Id.
32. In Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975), the Third Circuit upheld the district court's refusal to suppress a
gun which police had found on the roof of a house near the house where the defendant was
arrested. At the time of his arrest, the defendant indicated he had thrown a gun out the rear
window of the house, but he made the statement after indicating his desire to have an attor-
ney present. Thus, the gun was a fruit of the illegally obtained statement. The court agreed
with the lower court's finding that
in light of the observations of the police officers, the nature of the 'saturation'
search being conducted, the location of the luger (which, while out of sight, was
neither concealed so as to make detection exceedingly difficult nor deposited in a
location far removed from any place police had reason to search), and its identifi-
cation as a murder weapon, the police and F.B.I. agents would have found the
luger without utilization of [defendant's] statement.
Id. at 927-28.
In United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913
(1970), the Fourth Circuit found that information gained from the defendant's illegally
seized wallet may have accelerated his lawful arrest on a Baltimore warrant, but that be-
cause the police would have learned about the warrant and arrested the defendant even if
they had not discovered the papers in the wallet, any evidence subsequently obtained was
not tainted.
33. United States v. Houltin, 525 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 826
(1978); Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975);
United States v. Castellana, 488 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Brookins,
614 F.2d 1037, 1044-46 (5th Cir. 1980) (containing a detailed discussion of Fifth Circuit
precedent on the inevitable discovery exception).
34. United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1980), in which the court listed as
a third category of insufficient connection between fruit and poisonous tree derivative evi-
dence which "would inevitably have been discovered during a police investigation without
the aid of the illegally obtained evidence." d. at 1042.
35. E.g., United States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Kandik, 633 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hoffman, 607 F.2d 280 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 881 (1978).
36. 508 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1974).
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fruit; in addition to the independent source and attenuated connec-
tion tests, the court listed a third test as being met when "the evi-
dence inevitably would have been gained even without the unlawful
search.
37
Although the Eighth Circuit has applied the rationale of the
inevitable discovery exception in two cases, 38 in United States v.
Kely 39 the court expressly declined to decide "whether to follow the
Seventh Circuit and recognize the inevitable discovery limitation to
the exclusionary rule . . . because the government clearly failed to
establish that the evidence would have inevitably been gained with-
out the illegal search." 40
The Tenth Circuit recently adopted the inevitable discovery ex-
ception by implication in United States v. Leonard. In that case,
police found a gun in the glove compartment of the defendant's car
during an inventory search executed after his arrest. However, the
arresting officer had asked defendant if he had a gun before giving
him the Miranda warnings and defendant had revealed the gun's
location. The court agreed with the district court's refusal to sup-
press the gun because it was found as a result of the inventory
search rather than because of defendant's statement, but also be-
cause its discovery was inevitable regardless of the statement.
Thus, three circuit courts have expressly adopted this exception,
six have adopted it by implication through applying its rationale,
and one has expressly declined to decide whether to adopt it but has
recognized that it has been adopted by other circuits. Several state
courts have also either expressly or impliedly adopted the
37. Id. at 865. The court upheld the district court's refusal to suppress a witness' testi-
mony, stating that, because of other leads, "[i]t was inevitable that her identity would have
been revealed without her work address in the booklet [seized in an illegal search]." Id. at
866.
38. In United States v. DeMarce, 513 F.2d 755 (8th Cir. 1975), the court upheld the
admission of a rifle into evidence, finding that because police knew its approximate location,
they would have discovered it even without defendants' unlawfully elicited statements about
its location.
In United States v. Evans, 454 F.2d 813 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972), the
court upheld the district court's refusal to suppress witness testimony because it found that
normal police investigative procedures would have revealed the identity of the witnesses
even without the defendant's unlawfully elicited statements identifying them.
39. 547 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1977).
40. Id. at 86. In this case, the district court had suppressed items found in a warrantless
search of the defendant's car, but had refused to suppress the derivative evidence found as a
result. Reversing defendant's conviction, the court held that the government had failed to
prove that either the independent source or attenuated connection exceptions applied, so the
lower court should have suppressed all the evidence.
41. 630 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1980).
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exception.42
The inevitable discovery exception has been the subject of
much controversy. One commentator has approved it as serving the
purpose of the exclusionary rule well by denying the government
the use of illegally obtained evidence, yet at the same time minimiz-
ing the opportunity for the accused to receive "an undeserved and
socially undesirable bonanza."43 However, another commentator
has argued that, even though the logic of the exception has a certain
appeal, it is inconsistent with the purpose of the exclusionary rule,
and that the focus must remain on actualities not on probabilities if
the exclusionary rule is to remain a viable deterrent to illegal police
activity."
The majority of the cases which have applied the inevitable dis-
covery exception to the exclusionary rule have involved situations in
which the police illegality occurred during an investigation already
in progress; thus, the illegality merely served to accelerate the dis-
covery of evidence which would have been found eventually
through routine police investigatory procedures. 45 The primary
considerations in assessing the inevitability of discovery of evidence
in these cases are whether the procedures are the type standardly
employed by the law enforcement agency and whether the results of
the investigation are clearly predictable.46
The inevitable discovery limitation has been less frequently ap-
plied in situations involving a search conducted by police, because
of the unpredictable results of a search. For the inevitable discovery
exception to apply, the general burden of proof is on the prosecution
to show that the evidence would have been discovered by proper
and predictable investigatory procedures even without the illegal
act. This is really a two part test: the prosecution must show
(1) that proper and predictable investigatory procedures would
have been used by the police and (2) that these procedures would
42. Eg., State v. Tillery, 107 Ariz. 34, 481 P.2d 271 (1971); Lockridge v. Superior Ct. of
Los Angeles County, 3 Cal. 3d 166, 474 P.2d 683, 89 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 910 (1971); Cook v. State, 8 Md. App. 243, 259 A.2d 326 (1969); Santiago v. State, 444
S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
43. Unpoisoning the Fruit, supra note 7, at 317.
44. Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CAL. L. REV.
579, 630 (1968).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Leonard, 630 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Evans, 454 F.2d 813 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972); United States v. Seohnlein,
423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 (1970).
46. See, e.g., Leek v. Maryland, 353 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1965); Duckett v. State, 3 Md.
App. 563, 240 A.2d 332 (1968); Santiago v. State, 444 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
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inevitably have resulted in discovery of the evidence.47 In a search
situation, if the search is conducted incident to a lawful arrest or is
already planned, the second part of this test becomes crucial. The
prosecution can usually sustain its burden on this issue if the evi-
dence was located in an obvious place4  or was in plain sight.49
However, if the evidence was hidden, it is extremely difficult for the
prosecution to show that its discovery was inevitable even without
the illegally acquired information.50
Although it is clear that the prosecution has the burden of proof
of the inevitability of discovery, it is not so clear just what that bur-
den of proof is. Few cases applying the inevitable discovery excep-
tion have considered this question. In United States v. Schipani,5 1
the Second Circuit approved the district court's finding that the
prosecution's burden in these cases is a preponderance of the evi-
dence. However, the Third Circuit approved a "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" standard in Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau.52
In State v. Byrne, 3 the Missouri Court of Appeals set up a two-part
test for the prosecution to meet before application of the inevitable
discovery exception will be granted; the court stated that the prose-
cution must show by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the state
would have acquired the evidence through legal means regardless of
the illegality, and that (2) the police officers did not act in bad faith
in accelerating the discovery of the evidence.5 4
47. LaCount & Girese, supra note 18, at 491.
48. E.g., State v. Tillery, 107 Ariz. 34, 481 P.2d 271, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 847 (1971)
(evidence seized from the defendant's car which was parked alongside the road between the
point of arrest and the scene of the crime).
49. Eg., Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860
(1963) (incriminating evidence concerning cause of death was obtained from a body discov-
ered unhidden in defendant's apartment during an unlawful search).
50. E.g., People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1050 (1973). In this case, the New York court held that the prosecution had
met its burden of showing the inevitability of discovery of the murder weapon, which police
had found in the closet where the accused was hiding immediately before his arrest. The
court stated that the gun was properly admitted into evidence because if it were not found on
the defendant's person, "the next most reasonable place to look for it was where he had been
just before he was seized." Id. at 507, 300 N.E.2d at 142, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
51. 414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
52. 502 F.2d 914, 927 (3d Cir. 1974), cer. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975).
53. 595 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979), cert denied, 101 S. Ct. 355 (1980).
54. Id. at 305 (emphasis added). In this case, police discovered the gun used in a rob-
bery under a cake dish in the kitchen of a house where the defendant was arrested; however,
defendant had revealed its location in response to an officer's question before he was given
Miranda warnings. The court applied its two-part test to these facts, and found that search
of the kitchen and discovery of the gun were inevitable because police had found defendant
hiding in the kitchen. Also, the court found no bad faith in the officers' actions because
NOTES
The Arkansas Supreme Court, in adopting the inevitable dis-
covery exception in Fain v. State," first considered whether the gun
and money were indeed "fruits" of the illegal interrogation of Fain.
Finding that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of show-
ing that the evidence was not tainted fruit, the court stated that it
was nevertheless properly admitted at trial under the "Inevitable
Discovery Rule." 6 The court considered the rationale of the inevi-
table discovery exception, stating that it operates to remove evidence
discovered as the result of improper conduct from the exclusionary
rule if it is clearly evident that the evidence would have been discov-
ered in any event.57 However, the court stated that the rule must be
strictly adhered to, and set out a two-part test to determine its appli-
cability in a given situation. In order for the rule to apply, the state
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) it would have
acquired the items through legal means regardless of the illegality
and that (2) the police officers involved acted in good faith in accel-
erating the discovery of the evidence. 58 The court then "cautiously"
adopted the exception with the understanding that it was not in-
tended to erode the exclusionary rule,59 citing as its chief reason for
doing so the prevention of a situation in which a party can avoid
having incriminating evidence used against him by blurting out its
location when he observes the police about to discover it.6" The
court then applied the inevitable discovery exception to the facts of
the case and found the evidence clear and convincing that the items
would have been found even if Fain had not revealed their location
because one state policeman remained in the attic to search for them
throughout the entire time. Therefore, the court affirmed Fain's
conviction.61
Although the supreme court established a two-part test for de-
there was ample and sufficient evidence that they had seized the gun for their self-protection,
not knowing if defendant's armed accomplices were also hiding in the kitchen.
55. 271 Ark. 874, 611 S.W.2d 508 (1981).
56. Id. at 876, 611 S.W.2d at 509.
57. Id. The court noted that other states have adopted the inevitable discovery excep-
tion, citing State v. Byrne, 595 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979), cert denied, 101 S. Ct. 355
(1980) and People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1050 (1973).
58. Fain v. State 271 Ark. 874, 876, 611 S.W.2d 508, 509 (1981).
59. Id. at 877, 611 S.W.2d at 510.
60. Id. at 876-77, 611 S.W.2d at 509-10.
61. Id. at 877,611 S.W.2d at 510. In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Hickman stated
that he would not adopt the inevitable discovery exception cautiously with the idea that the




termining the applicability of the inevitable discovery exception
similar to that used by the Missouri Court of Appeals in State v.
Byrne,62 the court did not follow that test in Fain. It did not require
the prosecution to meet its burden of proof. In considering the first
part of the test, the requirement of inevitability of discovery even
without the defendant's illegally obtained statement, the court did
not require the prosecution to show that the officers would certainly
have discovered the gun and the money hidden under insulation in
the attic. Rather, the court seems to have just decided that these
items would inevitably have been found. Yet, because the evidence
was neither obvious nor in plain sight, it is unlikely that the prosecu-
tion could have met its burden of showing inevitable discovery by
clear and convincing evidence.
The court apparently failed to consider the second part of the
test altogether, making no mention of the officers' possible bad faith
in accelerating the discovery of the evidence. Since both suspects
were removed from the attic during the search, there was no self-
protection justification for accelerating the discovery as used by the
Missouri court in Byrne.63 Regardless, it seems that the court should
have remanded the case for the prosecution to have an opportunity
to meet its burden of proof before making the determination of the
exception's applicability.
Because the police officers had begun their search of the attic
before Fain's unlawful interrogation, the court could have applied
the independent source exception to the facts of this case and
reached the same result without adopting a new exception to the
exclusionary rule. The on-going search, which was lawful because
conducted pursuant to an arrest, was a real, not a hypothetical, in-
dependent source of the gun and money. The First Circuit in United
States v. Melvin6 and the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Leo-
nard65 applied the independent source exception to facts very simi-
lar to those in Fain.
It is unclear exactly what the supreme court meant by "cau-
tiously" adopting the inevitable discovery exception. Also, the
court's statement that the exception is not intended to erode the ex-
clusionary rule is interesting since the exception seems contrary to
the purpose of the rule because it actually encourages police short-
62. 595 S.W.2d 301 (Mo.. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 355 (1980).
63. Id. See note 54 supra.
64. 596 F.2d 492 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 837 (1979). See text accompanying
notes 29-31 supra.
65. 630 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1980). See text accompanying note 41 supra.
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cuts. If a result could be more easily or quickly obtained through
unlawful than through lawful means, it is natural to assume that the
police will take the unlawful route, particularly if they can then ex-
cuse the action by merely stating that the result would have been
obtained in any event. For example, in Fain, it was more expedient
to unlawfully interrogate Fain than to continue searching for the
gun and money with no guarantee that the items would ever be
found. However, the language used in adopting the inevitable dis-
covery exception indicates that the court is aware of the dangers of
the doctrine; further decisions on the subject are necessary to show
how this exception will be applied by state circuit courts and to what
extent it actually does erode the exclusionary rule in Arkansas.
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